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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
LLOYD WILLIAM NORMAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
15315 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case resulted from the filing of an information 
charging defendant, Lloyd William Norman, with attempted 
criminal homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(b} 
(1953), as amended (R.7). The information alleged that on 
or about December 25, 1976, at Clearfield, Utah, the 
defendant did, intending to cause serious bodily injury to 
another, commit an act clearly dangerous to human life, in 
that he shot Clifford D. Daniels. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 3, 1977, following a trial before 
Honorable Thornley K. Swan, Judge, defendant was found 
guilty of the crime of attempted manslaughter, a felony of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the third degree and was committed to the Division of 
Corrections for a ninety-day evaluation (T.258, R.29). 
On June 7, 1977, defendant was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for a term of zero to five years (T.268, R. 
28) • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays the Supreme Court affirm 
the decision of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 24, 1976, the defendant, Lloyd 
William Norman, was living with Mrs. Lucille Daniels 
:::; 
at the Hammond Motel, Clearfield, Utah (T.17,66). Mrs. 
Daniels was the manager of the motel. The victim, 
Clifford Daniels, son of Mrs. Lucille Daniels, and 
his wife and children were also living at the Hammond 
Motel (T.17). 
At trial, the victim testified as to several 
trips by his family and Mrs. Daniels and the defendant 
between his apartment and the one occupied by Mrs. 
Daniels and the defendant for the purposes of eating 
dinner (T.24,25) I exchanging gifts (T.25), and socializing 
(T.26). Both the defendant and Clifford drank throughout 
the evening (T.24-27). 
-2-
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Clifford testified that while at his mother's 
apartment later in the evening, he made several long 
distance telephone calls (T.28). Clifford was on the 
kitchen phone and the defendant was on an extension in 
the living room. During the course of a conversation 
with Clifford's brother, Clifford said that he could 
"beat Bill arm wresting, because he was just an old 
man." (T.29, lines 6,7). The defendant responded that 
Clifford "didn't know what a Norman could do." (T.29, 
line 10). At the conclusion of the call, Clifford 
testified that he returned immediately to the table 
where his wife and mother were seated, while the defendant 
was a few moments in returning from the living room (T.29). 
Shortly thereafter Clifford's wife and mother 
took his younger children home to bed. Upon Mrs. Daniels' 
return, Clifford and his oldest son, Chris, testified that 
Chris asked his father if he was ready to go home(T.30). 
Clifford replied that he was, but the defendant quickly 
responded, "No, he's going to sit here and we're going to 
drink some more." (T.30, lines 8,9). The defendant then 
told his son, Tony, to go with Chris to Clifford's house. 
Chris testified that before he and Tony left 
Mrs. Daniels' home, they placed a new, unrecorded cassette 
tape in a tape recorder Tony had received for Christmas, 
turned on the recording mechanism, and without the knowledge 
-3-
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of Clifford or the defendant placed the recorder in a 
position to record any subsequent conversation between 
the two (T.105-113). 
Clifford then testified that after his mother 
had returned, said goodnight and retired to bed, the 
defendant suddenly struck the table and asked Clifford 
if he was "fucking with a Norman." (T.31, line 14). 
Clifford responded "No~" but the defendant began to 
scream and yell at him and quickly proceeded to knock 
glasses, bottles and a knife from the table (T.31). As 
Clifford was rising from his chair to leave, the defendant 
stood, took a gun from under his belt and shot Clifford 
in the abdomen (T.31,32). Clifford testified that he 
fell back into the chair as defendant continued to curse 
and threatened to kill Clifford. Mrs. Daniels returned 
to the room and the defendant commanded her to get Clifford 
out of the house (T. 32) • As Clifford rose from his chair 
in an attempt to leave, he collapsed and fell to the floor 
where he remained until the police arrived. 
The testimony of the defendant, Lloyd William 
Norman, presented a different version of the events on 
December 24, 1976. 
-4-
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The defendant testified that after Mrs. Daniels 
had retired, Clifford began to argue with him {T.215). 
Shortly after calming him down, Clifford picked up a knife 
from the table, pointed it at the defendant and said 
he was going to "whip" the defendant (T.215,216). 
The defendant testified that he then rose from the 
table, went to the bedroom where he procured a gun, tucked 
it under his belt and then returned to the table where 
Clifford was sitting (T.219). Defendant, without Clifford's 
knowledge, then removed the pistol from his belt, cocked it 
and laid it on his lap underneath th~table pointing toward 
Clifford (T.220). 
Defendant testified that he next demanded the knife 
from Clifford. Clifford shoved it toward defendant, who 
picked it up and threw it against the wall {T.22). Defendant 
testified that his hands were wet when he reached underneath 
the table to uncock the hammer of the pistol. He testified 
that his fingers slipped, the gun discharged and Clifford 
was struck in the abdomen by a bullet {T.221). 
Following this incident, the defendant was charged 
with attempted criminal homicide (R.7). The defendant was 
then tried for this offense and convicted of attempted 
manslaughter from which he now appeals {T.258, R.29). 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER UTAH STATUTORY LAW, A PERSON MAY BE 
CHARGED WITH AND CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
The defendant, Lloyd William Norman, was 
charged with the crime of attempted criminal homicide 
in violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-203(b) (1953), 
as amended. Following trial, defendant was convicted 
of the crime of attempted manslaughter (T.258, R.29). 
By way of this appeal defendant argues that there is 
no such crime as attempted manslaughter and urges that 
his conviction be reversed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) provides: 
"Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) Recklessly causes the 
death of another; or 
(b) Causes the death of another 
under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which 
there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse . ••• " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (3) (1953), as amended, states 
that one acts: 
" [r] ecklessly, or maliciously, 
with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct 
when he is aware of but consciously dis-
regards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the circumstances exist or thP 
-6-
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result will occur. The risk must 
be of such a nature and degree that 
its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise 
under all the circW!lstances as viewed 
from the actor's standpoint." 
The Utah Criminal Code does not define "under the influence 
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" but case law 
provides definitions of similar phrases which may be useful. 
"Extreme emotional disturbance" has been defined in 
People v. Shelton, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 717, 88 Misc.2d 136 
(1976), as: 
11 
• • the emotional state of 
an individual, who: 
(a) has no mental disease or 
defect ••• ; and 
{b) is exposed to an extremely 
unusual and overwhelming stress; and 
{c) has an extreme emotional 
reaction to it, as a result of which 
there is a loss of self-control and 
reason is overborne by intense feelings, 
such as passion, anger, distress, 
grief, excessive agitation, or other 
similar emotions." 
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 383 N.Y.S.2d 
573 (1976), supplies a further definition. "Extreme emotional 
disturbance" results where: 
11
• • • a significant mental 
trauma has affected a defendant's 
mind for a substantial period of time, 
simmering in the unknowing subconscious 
and then inexplicably corning to the 
fore." 347 N.E.2d at 907. 
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Hence, under Utah law, a person commits man-
slaughter when he (1) is conscious of a risk, which if 
ignored would be a substantial deviation from the standard 
of care exercised by the average man, and disregards it, 
resulting in the death of another person, or (2) is under 
the influence of exceptionally unusual and overwhelming 
stress which causes him to loose self-control, resulting 
in the death of another. 
The Utah Criminal Code deals with attempt at 
Section 76-4-101: 
"(l) For purposes of this 
part a person is guilty of an 
attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability other-
wise required for the commission of 
the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, 
conduct does not constitute a sub-
stantial step unless it is strongly 
corroborative of the actor's intent to 
commit the offense." 
A careful reading of Section 76-4-101(1) reveals that a 
person has committed an attempt when (1) he acts with "the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission" 
of the substantive offense, and (2) his conduct constitutes 
"a substantial step toward commission of the offense." 
Appellant contends that there is no such crime 
as attempted manslaughter. He argues that the term 
-8-
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; . 
"culpability," as used in the attempt statute, means 
the ~ ~ inherent to the substantive criminal 
offense (Appellant's Brief, page 4). He states that 
culpability does not refer to reckless actions or 
actions which are the result of "extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance" and concludes that since there 
is no mens rea associated with the crime of manslaughter, 
there can be no crime of attempted manslaughter 
(Appellant's Brief, page 5). 
Respondent excepts to appellant's reasoning 
and conclusion and asserts that, undeE Utah statutory 
law, a person may be charged with and convicted of the 
crime of attempted manslaughter. 
The function of the law of criminal attempt 
is to permit courts to adjust penalties in cases where 
the conduct of the defendant falls short of the conduct 
required to constitute a completed offense. State v. 
Wilson, 218 Or. 575, 364 P.2d 115 (1959). Criminal 
attempt laws allow a court to adjust penalties in light 
of specific facts and circumstances to more accurately 
reflect the criminal responsibility and guilt of the 
defendant. Professor Arnold offers this analysis: 
"Suppose we say that the 
law of criminal attempts is not 
a classified set of rules describing 
the elements of any crime or covering 
any given conduct. When we talk about 
-9-
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the law of criminal attempts in 
general suppose we refer to it as 
a power or discretion that has 
been given to the courts either 
by the legislature or by common 
law precedent to extend the limits 
of prohibitions against certain 
kinds of conduct to conduct which 
does not quite fall within the terms 
of those prohibitions. We immediately 
recognize that this power is very 
similar to the power which courts 
have given themselves in that vague 
field known as common law crimes. 
This is a most useful logical 
device and, while it may seem 
vague, no one considers it confused. 
For example, suppose that a careless 
legislature omits the penalty in a 
criminal statute. The device of 
common law crimes provides a way out 
of the dilemma. A sketchy criminal 
code omits to prohibit an obviously 
dangerous kind of conduct. The 
power to punish for common law crimes 
gives the court freedom to act without 
appearing to encroach upon the legis-
lature. We are content to define this 
power in terms which are broad enough 
to cover any case which might arise. 
The vagueness of our definition, 
however, does not bother us because 
we do not regard the law against 
common law crimes as a law which 
must be enforced, such as the pro-
hibition law or the law against 
murder. Instead, we regard it as a 
useful device under which courts are 
free to fill up omissions in criminal 
codes. 
The law of criminal attempts is 
exactly the same kind of a thing. 
Considered apart from any particular 
crime it simply means that courts are 
permitted to fill in the gaps which a 
set of definitions inevitably leave 
when applied to human conduct. The 
-10-
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power to interpret statutes 
performs a similar function, but 
the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion of criminal statutes are 
never considered as definitions 
of crimes. The power to punish for 
criminal attempts gives the court 
power to extend a criminal statute 
without distorting its language. 
It is necessary to our criminal 
system. To treat this power as 
the definition of a substantive 
crime is either to destroy it or 
hopelessly to confuse it." 
Arnold, Criminal Attempts--The 
Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 
40 Yale Law Journal 53, 74, 75 
(1931). (Emphasis added.) 
This general statement of the policy and philosophy 
of the law of criminal attempt has be~n codified by the Utah 
Legislature. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1) (1953), as amended, 
provides: 
"If the court, having regard to 
the nature and circumstances of the 
offense of which the defendant was 
found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes 
that it would be unduly harsh to 
record the conviction as being for that 
category of offense established by 
statute and to sentence the defendant 
to an alternative normally applicable 
to that offense, the court may enter 
a judgment of conviction for the 
next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly." 
Thus, the law of criminal attempt is a flexible law 
provided to aid a court in more fairly and equitably 
arriving at a punishment which correctly reflects the 
guilt of the defendant. Courts should be allowed broad 
-11-
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discretion in its application, taking into consideration 
all facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's 
criminal acts. 
Again, the Code provides that a person is 
guilty of an attempt when (1) he acts with "the kind of 
culpability otherwise required" for the commission of the 
substantive offense, and (2) his conduct constitutes a 
"substantial step toward commission of the offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1953), as amended. The Criminal 
Code defines "culpable mental state" in Utah Code Ann, § 
76-2-102 (1953), as amended: 
"Every offense not involving 
strict liability shall require a 
culpable mental state, and when 
the definition of the offense does 
not specify a culpable mental state, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 76-2-102 states that recklessness will 
supply the criminal responsibilityorculpability when the 
offense does not involve strict liability and the statutory 
definition of the crime does provide a culpable mental 
state. Section 76-5-205(1), the code definition of man-
slaughter, does not set forth a culpable mental state. 
Therefore, Section 76-2-102 applies and provides that 
"recklessness" will establish the culpable mental state. 
-12-
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Once "recklessness" has been adopted as the culpable 
mental state of manslaughter, the crime of attempted 
manslaughter is then possible. 
Both requirements of the attempt statute, 
when applied to the crime of manslaughter--a culpable 
mental state and a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense--are fulfilled in the instant case. 
The defendant testified that he obtained a pistol from 
the bedroom, placed it on his lap underneath the table 
aimed in Clifford's direction and cocked it, all without 
Clifford's knowledge (T.219,220). The defendant further 
testified that he was not in fear of his life or frightened 
by Clifford (T.229). As defendant later attempted to 
uncock the pistol, the hammer slipped from his wet fingers, 
the pistol discharged and the bullet struck clifford in 
the abdomen (T.221). The defendant's actions in secretly 
aiming a loaded pistol, hammer cocked and cartridge in 
the chamber, at the victim during the course of a heated 
conversation after an evening of heavy drinking constituted 
recklessness in that it was conduct which disregarded the 
standard of care exercisable by an ordinary person. An 
ordinary person, neither fearful nor frightened, would 
not aim a loaded pistol at another in such an awkward 
and clumsy manner. Thus, the first element of the crime 
-13-
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of attempted manslaughter, recklessness under circumstances 
which could result in the death of another, is fulfilled. 
The second element of attempted manslaughter, 
an act which constitutes a substantial step toward the 
death of another, was fulfilled as the defendant attempted, 
while his hands were wet, to release the hammer of a 
loaded and cocked pistol held in an awkward position. 
Trying to release the hammer of a loaded pistol in such a 
clumsy manner is a substantial step toward the commission 
of manslaughter when coupled with recklessness. 
Therefore, both elements of the attempt statute 
having been complied with~ the defendant's actions under 
the stated circumstances amount to the crime of attempted 
manslaughter. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED 
MANSLAUGHTER HE NEED NOT BE RETRIED ON THE ORIGINAL CHARGES. 
The defendant was convicted of attempted manslaugri! 
a criminal offense under Utah law as defined by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101 (1) (1953), as amended. There is, therefore,, 
no reason or need for the defendant to be retried for the 
original offense. 
-14-
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POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE VERDICT RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Defendant argues that if this Court sustains 
his conviction for attempted manslaughter, he is none-
theless entitled to reversal and release in that the 
evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain 
the verdict. 
Respondent contends that even when the evidence 
is viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, it 
is sufficient to sustain a conviction of attempted 
manslaughter. This Court has consistently maintained 
that on appeal it will not "weigh the evidence nor say 
what quantum is necessary to establish a fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt so long as the evidence given is 
substantial." State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 
1976). On appeal, the evidence will be examined in "the 
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Canfield, 
18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196, 199 (1967}. See also 
State v. Coffey, 564 P.2d 777 (Utah 1977}; State v. 
Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 11 Utah 2d 208 (1960}. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the verdict, it is clear that the evidence taken at 
trial was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of 
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attempted manslaughter. Appellant testified that he 
and Clifford sat at the kitchen table while Clifford held 
a knife and challenged him (T.214,215). The defendant 
then left the table to procure a gun from the bedroom, 
whereupon he returned but hid the gun under his belt 
(T.216,217). Once he was seated, the defendant secretly 
took the gun from under his belt, cocked the hammer and 
placed the gun on his lap aimed in the victim's direction 
(T.219,220). Defendant then asked Clifford for the knife 
whereupon Clifford provided him with the same which he 
promptly picked up and threw against the wall (T.220). 
While his hands were wet, the defendant tried to uncock 
the gun but the hammer slipped from his fingers, the gun 
discharged and the bullet struck Clifford in the abdomen 
(T.220-222). 
It is apparent that this, the defendant's 
version of the facts, clearly supports the conviction 
of attempted manslaughter. The defendant's actions in 
secretly aiming a loaded pistol, hammer cocked and cartridge 
in the chamber, at the victim during the course of a heated 
conversation after an evening of heavy drinking constituted 
recklessness which could result in the death of another. 
The defendant's further action of attempting to release 
the hammer of a loaded and cocked pistol while his hands 
. . . 1 t toward 
were wet and slippery constituted a substantia s ep 
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the death of another. Thus, the evidence produced at 
trial was of a weight sufficient to support a verdict 
of guilty of attempted manslaughter. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent asserts that defendant was properly 
convicted of the crime of attempted manslaughter. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1953), as amended, provides that 
a person is guilty of attempt when (1) he acts with "the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission" 
of the substantive offense, and (2) his conduct constitutes 
"a substantial step toward commission of the offense." 
In the case of manslaughter, the culpable state of mind 
is "recklessness." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1953), as 
amended. Thus, where the defendant's actions are reckless 
under circumstances which could result in the death of another 
and he further acts in a manner which constitutes a substantial 
step toward the death of another, the defendant is guilty of 
attempted manslaughter. 
Respondent further contends that the evidence 
produced at trial was sufficient to support and fulfill each 
element of the crime. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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